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I.	Abstract	
The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	approach	the	act	and	process	of	
forgiveness	 as	 an	 imperfect	 human	 ability	 for	 peace,	 exploring	 the	
pragmaticality,	 prudentiality	 and	 ethicality	 of	 human	 forgiveness	
before	moral	wrongs.		
To	conduct	my	research,	firstly	I	will	assume	the	epistemological	
turn	that	has	been	developed	at	the	UNESCO	Chair	of	Philosophy	for	
Peace	from	Universitat	Jaume	I.	This	epistemological	turn	means	we	
no	longer	work	with	a	negative	definition	of	peace	but	a	positive	one,	
that	is,	we	do	not	define	peace	as	the	absence	of	violence,	but	as	the	
presence	of	social	justice.		
Secondly,	 I	will	establish	a	dialogue	between	the	Philosophy	for	
Peace	approach	and	Christian	theology	as	a	key	element	for	grasping	
a	deeper	understanding	of	the	act	and	process	of	forgiveness,	since	
this	imperfect	human	ability	of	forgiveness	has	been	a	core	theme	of	
the	Christian	religion	during	the	last	two	thousand	years.	
It	 is	 argued	 that	 imperfect	 human	 forgiveness	 is	 pragmatically,	
prudentially	 and	 ethically	 adequate	 when	 we	 need	 to	 address	
different	moral	wrongs	 in	different	 contexts	of	 violence.	 Therefore,	
fostering	 forgiveness	 in	 those	 settings	 may	 help	 us	 to	 build	 more	
peaceful	 societies,	 as	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	we	 have	 learnt	 to	 hurt	
each	other,	we	can	learn	to	forgive	one	another.	
Key	 words:	 Christian	 narrative,	 divine	 forgiveness,	
epistemological	 turn,	 human	 ability,	 human	 forgiveness,	 imperfect	
forgiveness,	 imperfect	 peace,	 moral	 wrongs,	 philosophy	 for	 peace,	
post-conflict.	
	
II.	Introduction	
Forgiveness	is	a	mysterious	and	complex	concept.	It	is	difficult	to	
define	 because	 it	 is	 part	 of	 popular	 culture	 and	 has	 different	
connotations	depending	on	the	context	 in	which	 it	 is	used.	 It	 is	one	
of	 those	 topics	 that	 academic	 researchers	 from	 varying	 fields	 have	
been	 studying	 in	 recent	 years,	 precisely	 because	 forgiveness	places	
itself	 across	 different	 disciplines,	 or	 using	 Wittgenstein’s	
terminology,	 we	 could	 say	 forgiveness	 is	 uncircumscribed	 (Bash,	
2015),	without	definitive	boundaries.	Therefore,	to	grasp	some	of	its	
different	 implications	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 approach	 forgiveness	 from	
multiple	perspectives	such	as	philosophical,	psychological,	political	or	
theological.1	 In	 this	 paper	 we	 will	 consider	 what	 a	 Philosophy-for-
Peace	 perspective	 may	 contribute	 to	 forgiveness,	 by	 defining	
																																								 																				
1	I	have	approached	the	political	aspects	of	forgiveness	in	a	recent	book	(Jiménez,	2017),	and	
some	aspects	of	the	psychology	of	forgiveness	in	another	publication	(Jiménez,	2018).	
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forgiveness	 as	 an	 imperfect	 human	 ability	 for	 peace.2	We	will	 also	
look	at	 contributions	 from	Christian	 theology,	 since	Christianity	has	
been	 imparting	 the	 importance	 of	 forgiveness	 from	 its	 inception,	
following	the	message	of	Jesus	of	Nazareth.	
In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Valencian	 theologian	 José	 Ignacio	 González	
Faus	 (1993:	 180)	 states:	 «forgiveness	 enters	 into	 human	 history	
through	Christianity».3	 The	philosopher	Amelia	Valcárcel	 (2010:	 62)	
also	 stresses	 that	 the	 greatest	 contribution	 of	 Christianity	 is	 the	
relevance	 it	 give	 to	 forgiveness,	 something	 missed	 in	 the	 Ancient	
World,	 a	 world	 regulated	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘an	 eye	 for	 an	 eye	 and	 a	
tooth	 for	 a	 tooth’	 and	 by	 the	 definition	 of	 justice	 made	 by	 Plato:	
‘Justice	is	treating	friends	well	and	enemies	badly’.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 although	 Christian	 theology	 does	
not	 have	 the	 same	 epistemic	 status	 as	 natural	 sciences,	 other	
epistemologies	are	possible,	such	as	those	that	are	based	on	human	
intersubjectivity	 (Comins	 and	 Albert,	 2012:	 6)	 or	 reformed	
epistemologies	(Plantinga,	2000).	Furthermore,	Christian	theologians	
would	 defend	 that	 they	 find	 certain	 epistemic	 validity	 in	 the	
historical	 figure	 of	 Jesus,	 who	would	 be	 the	 image	 of	 the	 invisible	
God	(Colossians	1:	15,	Bible).	
Combining	 the	 philosophical	 approach	 and	 the	 Christian	
perspective	we	will	see	that	human	forgiveness,	although	imperfect,	
is	 pragmatically,	 prudentially	 and	 ethically	 adequate	 to	 face	 moral	
wrongs	such	as	different	types	of	violence	(Galtung,	1969,	1990).4	
III.	Objectives	
We	 think	 it	 would	 be	 helpful	 to	 reconstruct	 a	 normative	
framework	 from	 where	 the	 competence	 or	 ability	 of	 imperfect	
forgiveness	 can	 be	 rebuilt,5	 so	 we	 could	 understand	 and	 foster	
forgiveness	in	post-conflict	violent	settings.	 In	this	regard,	I	propose	
that	 fostering	 forgiveness	can	create	a	more	peaceful	world,	where	
the	safety	of	our	future	will	not	be	based	on	the	quantity	and	quality	
of	our	weapons,	but	on	the	quality	of	our	relations.		
Due	to	the	limited	space	to	develop	a	normative	framework	for	
the	act	and	process	of	forgiveness,	my	main	objective	in	this	paper	is	
to	examine	some	of	the	qualities	of	this	imperfect	human	ability	for	
																																								 																				
2	Human	forgiveness	would	be	imperfect	in	the	same	way	that	human	peace	is	imperfect;	that	
means	it	is	unfinished	and	in	a	continuous	movement	(Muñoz,	2001:	21).	Human	forgiveness	
imperfection	is	linked	to	eschatological	or	final	orientation,	since	only	at	the	moment	of	death	
does	 our	 forgiving	 (or	 not)	 of	 another	 reach	 a	 point	 of	 perfection	 and	 irreversibility	 (Voiss,	
2015:	386).	
3	Own	translation.	
4	The	Norwegian	author	Johan	Galtung	writes	about	three	types	of	violence:	direct,	structural	
and	cultural.	This	categorization	has	been	widely	accepted	in	the	field	of	Peace	Studies.	
5	 The	 philosopher	 Glen	 Pettigrove	 (2012)	 has	 been	working	 on	 a	 normative	 framework	 for	
forgiveness	during	the	last	years,	but	as	he	acknowledges,	this	normative	framework	is	still	in	
its	first	stages.	
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peace,	 such	 its	pragmaticality,	prudentiality,	and	ethicality,	 in	order	
to	encourage	its	implementation	before	moral	wrongs	performed	by	
individual	or	collective	agents.	
IV.	Material	and	methods	
To	conduct	my	research	and	to	achieve	my	objectives	 I	will	use	
different	bibliographic	resources,	assuming	the	epistemological	turn	
of	 the	 UNESCO	 Chair	 of	 Philosophy	 for	 Peace	 (Martínez	 Guzmán,	
2000,	2001,	2005),6	which	defines	peace	not	 just	as	 the	absence	of	
direct	violence	such	as	wars	or	terrorism	(Galtung,	1969),	but	as	the	
presence	 of	 social	 justice.	 Moreover,	 the	 Chair	 defend	 we	 have	
human	 competences	 or	 abilities	 for	 peace,	 such	 as	 tenderness	 and	
care	 (Comins	Mingol,	 2003,	 2009)	 or	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	
(Jiménez	Robles,	2009,	2016),	among	others.	
We	 will	 bring	 together	 the	 philosophical	 and	 the	 theological	
approach	 in	 regards	 to	 forgiveness,	 and	 we	 will	 explore	 three	
different	qualities	of	this	imperfect	human	ability	for	peace.	
V.	Findings	
The	pragmaticality	of	forgiveness	
Human	 relations	 are	 fragile;	 we	 hurt	 and	 are	 hurt	 by	 others	
easily.	Our	natural	reactions	 in	the	face	of	violence	are	to	run	away	
or	 contra-violence,	 when	 we	 choose	 the	 latter	 option,	 either	 as	
individual	or	collective	agents,	we	 fall	 into	spirals	of	violence	which	
lead	us	into	increased	hurt	and	pain.	In	order	to	overcome	this	reality	
we	 need	 a	 third	 option;	 neither	 running	 away	 nor	 contra-violence,	
but	 using	 different	 imperfect	 human	 abilities	 for	 peace	 such	 as	
forgiveness.	
We	 learn	 from	 Hanna	 Arendt	 (1958)	 about	 the	 potential	 of	
forgiveness	 to	 break	 the	 cycles	 of	 violence	 that	 undermine	 human	
development,	 since	 the	 author	 depicts	 forgiveness	 as	 a	 human	
faculty	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 undo	 the	 irreversibility	 of	 our	 violent	
actions.		
Considering	 we	 live	 in	 a	 world	 where	 violent	 conflicts	 are	
commonplace	 (Fisas,	 2015;	 Pettersson	 and	 Wallensteen,	 2015;	
Philpott,	 2012;	 Rogers,	 2016),	 learning	 about	 the	 imperfect	 human	
ability	of	forgiveness,	and	promoting	it,	could	be	one	of	the	greatest	
contributions	of	Christianity	for	our	current	turbulent	time,	because	
as	Hannah	Arendt	(1958:	238)	stated:	
																																								 																				
6	The	UNESCO	Chair	of	Philosophy	 for	Peace	was	established	 in	1999	at	Universitat	 Jaume	 I	
(Spain)	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	 University	 of	 Granada	 (Spain),	 the	 University	 of	 Innsbruk	
(Austria),	the	University	Federal	of	Sergipe	(Brazil)	and	the	University	Autónoma	of	the	State	
of	 Mexico	 (Toluca,	 Mexico),	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 constant	 work	 on	 the	 building	 and	
dissemination	of	cultures	to	create	peace.	
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The	 discoverer	of	 the	 role	 of	 forgiveness	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 human	
affairs	was	Jesus	of	Nazareth.	The	fact	that	he	made	this	discovery	in	
a	 religious	 context	 and	 articulated	 it	 in	 religious	 language	 is	 no	
reason	to	take	it	any	less	seriously	in	a	strictly	secular	sense.	
The	prudentiality	of	forgiveness	
When	 victims	 forgive	 they	 desist	 resenting	 the	wrongdoers.	 In	
that	 sense,	 in	 individual	 or	 group	 post-conflict	 violent	 contexts,	
imperfect	 human	 forgiveness	 would	 be	 prudentially	 adequate	 by	
liberating	 the	 victims	 from	 their	 anger	 and	 resentment,	 and	 by	
strengthening	the	resilience	of	the	victims	for	the	future.		
The	 first	 person	 to	 identify	 the	 impact	 of	 forgiveness	 on	 the	
health	 of	 the	 victim	was	 the	 theologian,	 philosopher	 and	 preacher	
Joseph	 Butler	 in	 a	 couple	 of	 sermons	 delivered	 in	 1718	 in	 London	
(Butler,	1970).	He	was	inspired	by	Matthew	5:	43-44	from	the	Bible,	
and	 he	 pointed	 out	 that	 forgiveness	 is	 the	 forswearing	 of	 revenge,	
which	 would	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 resentment.	 A	 number	 of	
psychologists	(Enright,	2001,	2012;	McCullough,	2008;	Worthington,	
2003,	2005,	2009)	and	philosophers	(Digeser,	2001,	2004;	Griswold,	
2007;	 Murphy,	 2003;	 Strawson,	 1980)	 who	 have	 been	 researching	
forgiveness	have	accepted	this	point	suggested	by	Joseph	Butler	300	
years	ago.	For	example,	the	psychologist	Everett	Worthington	(2003:	
22)	writes	 a	 few	provoking	words	 on	 resentment	 that	 point	 to	 the	
prudentiality	of	forgiveness	for	the	victims	of	moral	wrongs:		
Resentment	 is	 like	 carrying	 around	 a	 red-hot	 rock	 with	 the	
intention	of	someday	throwing	it	back	at	the	one	who	hurt	you.	 It	
tires	us	and	burns	us.	Who	wouldn´t	want	simply	to	let	the	rock	fall	
to	the	ground?	You´ll	be	healthier	and	happier	if	you	forgive	than	if	
you	stew	in	your	unforgiveness.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 being	 forgiven	 is	 also	 prudential	 for	 the	
offenders,	 since	when	 they	 repent	 and	 receive	 forgiveness	 they	 rid	
themselves	of	their	uncomfortable	feelings	produced	by	the	effect	of	
their	immoral	actions.	The	relief	for	the	offender	comes	through	the	
covering	of	the	immoral	action	by	the	work	of	forgiveness.	That	does	
not	mean	that	through	human	forgiveness	the	past	is	forgotten,	but	
that	 it	 is	 transformed,	 liberating	both	victim	and	offender	 from	the	
negative	 effect	 of	 the	 immoral	 action.	 Following	 the	 thoughts	 of	
Nicolai	 Hartmann	 in	 Ética	 (2011),	 we	 could	 say	 that	 when	 victims	
forgive	an	action	that	was	morally	wrong,	although	imperfect	human	
forgiveness	neither	undoes	the	historical	fact	nor	removes	the	moral	
guilt	 of	 the	wrong	 action,	 it	would	 have	 the	 power	 to	 reshape	 the	
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past.	 This	 opens	 the	 doors	 to	 a	 human	 reconciliation,7	 which	
although	imperfect,	may	help	us	to	live	in	more	peaceful	societies.		
Hannah	 Arendt	 (1958)	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 creative	 and	 healing	
power	of	forgiveness,	she	also	knew	that	no	one	before	Jesus	taught	
as	clearly	about	 loving	our	enemies	 (Matthew	5:44,	Bible),	and	 it	 is	
precisely	through	forgiveness	that	this	love	towards	enemies	will	be	
shown	 more	 clearly.	 Loving	 people	 will	 open	 the	 doors	 to	 forgive	
them	when	 they	act	morally	wrong,	as	philosopher	Glen	Pettigrove	
suggests	in	his	book	Forgiveness	and	Love	(2012).	
Loving	wrongdoers	 does	 not	mean	 necessarily	 liking	 them,	 but	
wishing	 them	well	 and	 showing	 kindness	 according	 to	 their	 needs.	
Loving	 and	 forgiving	 enemies	 is	 difficult,	 however	 continuous	 hate	
and	 resentment	 controls	 the	 lives	 of	 those	 who	 persist	 in	 keeping	
hate	 and	 resentment	 in	 their	 hearts,	 not	 allowing	 them	 to	 move	
forward.	 Desmond	 Tutu	 captured	 the	 essence	 of	 this	 reality	 in	 the	
title	of	his	book	There	is	no	future	without	forgiveness	(1999),	which	
he	 wrote	 after	 chairing	 the	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	
from	South	Africa.	
The	ethicality	of	forgiveness	
Forgiveness	 provides	 a	 new	 opportunity	 to	 the	 offenders	 by	
allowing	 them	 to	 be	 reintegrated	 into	 their	 communities.	 As	 the	
Spanish	philosopher	Javier	Sádaba	(1995:	89)	writes:	«to	forgive	is	to	
embrace,	 in	 one,	 the	 whole	 humanity».8	 From	 this	 perspective	
offenses	do	not	exhaust	the	value	of	offenders,	since	human	value	is	
inexhaustible	as	Immanuel	Kant	taught	more	than	two	hundred	years	
ago	 when	 he	 wrote	 Groundwork	 of	 the	 Metaphysics	 of	 Morals	
(1785),	where	he	affirmed	that	human	beings	have	intrinsic	value	or	
dignity	 rooted	 in	 their	 capacity	 for	 autonomous	 rational	 agency,	
which	 makes	 them	 worthy	 of	 respect	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 immoral	
actions.	 Taking	 this	 idea	 of	 human	 dignity	 into	 account	 may	 be	
helpful	 for	 enabling	 victims	 to	 forgive	 their	 offenders	 and	
perpetrators,	assuming	there	is	room	for	moral	transformation.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Christian	 narrative	 would	 consider	
human	 beings	 worthy	 of	 respect	 too,	 but	 from	 a	 different	
perspective.	 The	 Bible	 states	 in	 Genesis	 1:	 26-27:	 «God	 created	
mankind	 in	 his	 own	 image»,	 therefore,	 as	 Danish	 author	 Søren	
Kierkegaard	 wrote	 in	 his	 Works	 of	 Love,	 every	 human	 being	
possesses	 an	 inner	 glory.	 That	 means	 each	 person	 is	 born	 with	 a	
special	dignity,	which	makes	them	worthy	of	honour.	For	those	who	
share	 the	Christian	 faith,	 being	 aware	of	 this	may	help	 them	when	
																																								 																				
7	 Victims	 can	 forgive	 unilaterally	 their	 offenders,	 independently	 of	 the	 attitude	 of	 those	
offenders,	 but	 reconciliation	 would	 not	 be	 advisable	 until	 the	 offenders	 repent	 of	 their	
immoral	 actions,	 otherwise,	 the	 victims	 would	 be	 placing	 themselves	 in	 an	 unnecessary	
dangerous	position.	
8	Own	translation.	
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they	 struggle	 to	 forgive	 their	 enemies,	 since	 even	 their	 enemies	
would	be	made	in	the	likeness	of	the	God	they	worship.9		
Consequently,	either	from	a	philosophical	point	of	view	or	from	
a	 Christian	 perspective,	 human	 beings	would	 be	worthy	 of	 honour	
and	respect	even	when	they	commit	immoral	acts,	therefore	offering	
forgiveness	 to	 an	 offender	 would	 be	 ethically	 adequate.	
Nevertheless,	 we	 also	 need	 to	 notice	 that	 forgiving	 is	
supererogatory,	 that	 means	 that	 usually	 offering	 forgiveness	 is	
ethically	good	and	advisable	for	the	victims,	but	it	is	not	compulsory.	
In	other	words,	offering	forgiveness	is	the	victims’	prerogative.	
VI.	Discussion	and	conclusion	
Deepening	into	the	Christian	narrative	of	forgiveness		
Biblical	 forgiveness	 has	 two	 levels:	 a	 human-horizontal	
(imperfect)	 and	 a	 divine-vertical	 (perfect):	 we	 could	 say	 human-
horizontal	forgiveness	towards	enemies	would	be	part	of	an	ancient	
Christian	 wisdom	 for	 a	 violent	 world	 that	 needs	 healing	 and	
restoration.	When	victims	forgive	their	enemies,	they	break	the	cycle	
of	 violence	 that	 comes	 from	 seeking	 revenge	 (pragmatic	 and	
prudential	 aspects	 of	 forgiveness),	 and	 this	 means	 they	 are	 not	
allowing	the	evil	to	be	spread	into	the	world,	because	by	forgiving,	by	
turning	the	other	cheek	(Matthew	5:	39,	Bible),	that	evil	is	absorbed	
and	dyes	in	the	victims.10	
	Besides	 this	 imperfect/human-horizontal	 forgiveness,	 the	
Christian	 narrative	 also	 refers	 to	 a	 transcendent	 or	 perfect/divine-
vertical	 forgiveness	 available	 for	 every	 person.11	 In	 this	 regard,	
Christianity	defends	we	live	in	a	world	affected	by	evil	and	sin,	which	
has	 permeated	everything,	 including	human	beings.12	Using	Donald	
Shriver	words’	(1995:	22):	
Something	went	wrong	in	the	world	before	any	one	of	us	arrived	in	
it	or	had	time	to	think	about	the	nature	of	that	wrong.	Whether	in	
families	that	impose	the	faults	of	a	previous	generation	upon	their	
																																								 																				
9	 On	 this	 account,	 offenders	 could	 also	 take	 the	 initiative	 in	 seeking	 forgiveness	 from	 their	
victims	and	enemies.	John	Paul	Lederach	(2014:	29-43)	refers	to	a	biblical	story	that	illustrates	
this	point:	when	Jacob	takes	up	the	 journey	toward	his	victim,	his	brother	and	enemy	Esau,	
Jacob	‘sees’	the	face	of	God	when	he	meets	Esau	(Genesis	33:	10,	Bible).	
10	 Pamela	 Hieronymi	 (2001)	 is	 unique	 among	 the	 philosophers	 addressing	 this	 aspect	 of	
forgiveness.	
11	Divine	forgiveness	from	a	Christian	point	of	view	would	be	perfect,	in	theological	terms	we	
could	say	it	would	be	eschatological	or	final	(Volf,	1996).		
12	 The	philosopher	 Jeffrie	Murphy	 (2003:	 100)	writes:	 «Both	Augustine	and	Kant	 regard	our	
actual	world	as	fallen	and	sinful	–a	world	in	which	even	those	seeking	to	promote	justice	and	
order	and	even	love	will	risk	having	their	efforts	corrupted	by	the	evil	and	depravity	latent	in	
their	own	natures».	Vicent	Martínez	(1995:	85)	also	points	to	some	Kantian	thoughts	on	this:	
«From	 Kant,	 we	 can	 learn	 about	 the	 painful	 experiences	 of	 human	 beings	 [...]	 or	 how	 the	
human	 nature	 imposes	 on	 us	 the	 idea	 of	 human	 beings	 as	 twisted	 trunks	 of	 wood»	 (own	
translation).	
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children	 or	 in	 political	 communities	 that	 do	 the	 same,	 we	 never	
have	the	luxury	of	a	truly	fresh	choice	of	the	battlefield	of	our	own	
struggle	with	 evil.	 This	 is	what	 Christian	 theologians	 chiefly	mean	
by	original	sin	[...]	in	our	most	reflective	moments	we	are	bound	to	
acknowledge	 that,	 in	 indefinite	 regress,	 wrong	 arrived	 before	 we	
did.	
Sooner	or	later	everyone	would	fall	prey	of	that	original	evil	and	
sin	 to	 commit	 a	moral	 wrong,	 usually	 in	 the	 form	 of	 attacking	 the	
dignity	 of	 another	 person	 using	 violence	 against	 their	 physical	 or	
psychological	integrity.	Christianity	affirms	that	attacking	the	dignity	
of	another	person	implies	attacking	God	himself,	since	every	person	
was	created	in	God’s	likeness.	In	that	sense,	the	offender	would	need	
to	be	forgiven	by	God	too,	who	is	able	to	wash	offenders	clean	from	
their	immorality	and	sinfulness.	
As	 we	 said	 before,	 Nicolai	 Hartman	 (2011)	 points	 out	 that	
human	forgiveness	removes	the	sting	of	an	immoral	action,	although	
it	does	not	have	the	power	to	remove	the	moral	guilt;	nevertheless,	
the	Christian	perspective	says	that	God	has	the	power	to	remove	the	
moral	guilt	of	an	immoral	and	sinful	action	too,	as	we	could	read	in	
some	 Bible	 passages	 (Psalm	 51:	 1-7;	 John	 1:	 29;	 Colossians	 1:	 13-
14).13		
Christian	 teachings	 encourage	 victims	 to	 forgive	 offenders	
horizontally	 after	 an	 immoral	 action	 or	 offense	 has	 occurred	
(Matthew	18:	21-22	and	Colossians	3:	13,	Bible),	which	would	allow	
them	to	be	reconciled	if	the	offender	repents	and	both	parts	wish	to	
reconcile	 (ethical	 aspect	 of	 forgiveness).	 This	 opens	 the	 doors	 to	 a	
human	 imperfect	peace.	Nevertheless,	 there	 is	a	stronger	emphasis	
on	divine	forgiveness	(1	John	1:9	and	Acts	3:	19,	Bible),	which	would	
enable	people	to	be	reconciled	with	God	and	also	in	a	deeper	sense	
to	other	human	fellows.		
This	 divine	 forgiveness	 would	 be	 possible	 only	 through	 the	
atoning	death	of	Jesus	on	the	cross.14	Since	Jesus	would	be	the	only	
innocent	or	sinless	person	that	ever	lived,	he	would	be	the	only	one	
that	could	take	over	him	the	sins	of	others.	Anyone	else	should	die	
for	their	own	sins,	but	Jesus	would	be	 in	the	position	to	die	for	the	
																																								 																				
13	One	of	the	reasons	Christians	believe	Jesus	is	God	is	because	he	forgives	sins	as	God	does	
(Mark	2:	1-12	and	Luke	7:	36-50,	Bible).	According	to	the	Christian	narrative,	Jesus’	forgiveness	
would	remove	the	sting	and	the	guilt	of	an	immoral	and	sinful	action.		
14	 The	 theologian	 James	 Voiss	 (2015:	 298)	 explains	 the	 atonement	 as	 follows:	 «Humankind	
had	 committed	 an	 infinite	 offense	 in	 sinning	 against	 God,	 because	God´s	 dignity	 is	 infinite.	
Consequently,	it	was	necessary	that	one	of	infinite	dignity	who	was	guilty	of	no	offense	should	
make	satisfaction	for	us.	Thus	God	had	to	become	human	to	make	the	necessary	sacrifice	to	
save	 humanity	 from	 permanent	 alienation	 from	 God».	 In	 this	 line	 of	 thoughts	 Oliver	 Crisp	
(2015:	 14)	writes:	 «Christ	 somehow	brings	 about	 human	 reconciliation	with	God,	 buying	 us	
back,	as	it	were,	at	the	great	price	of	his	own	life	in	an	act	of	vicarious	supererogation».	This	
atoning	death	of	Jesus	on	the	cross	would	be	God’s	wisdom	(1	Corinthians	1:22-24,	Bible),	the	
innocent	and	sinless	dying	on	behalf	of	the	guilty,	since	only	someone	innocent	could	die	on	
behalf	of	others.	
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sins	 of	 others.15	 Therefore,	 it	 would	 be	 through	 Jesus’	 death	 that	
God’s	arms	would	be	open	to	forgive	people,	or	using	Miroslav	Volf’s	
(1996)	words:	 «God’s	 forgiveness	 creates	 the	 space	 for	 humans	 to	
receive	God’s	embrace».		
Christian	 theology	 would	 say	 forgiveness	 is	 a	 gift	 available	 for	
every	person,	but	as	any	gift,	it	needs	to	be	accepted.	In	other	words,	
and	 metaphorically	 speaking,	 the	 Christian	 God	 would	 offer	
forgiveness	 like	 a	 cheque	 for	 the	 offenders	 to	 be	 forgiven,	 so	 they	
would	 need	 to	 cash	 the	 cheque	 of	 forgiveness	 in	 the	 bank	 of	
repentance,	 where	 forgiveness	 can	 be	 credited	 to	 the	 offenders.	
Accordingly,	 although	 God	 would	 offer	 forgiveness	 to	 everyone	
through	the	death	of	Jesus	on	the	cross,	divine	forgiveness	would	be	
experienced	 in	 the	 life	 of	 those	 persons	 who	 accept	 it	 with	 an	
attitude	 of	 repentance	 (1	 John	 1:9,	 Bible),16	 which	means	 that	 the	
offenders	 agree	 with	 God	 in	 condemning	 the	 immoral	 and	 sinful	
action	 as	 such,	 detaching	 themselves	 from	 it,	 and	 trying	 not	 to	
repeat	 it.	 Then,	 and	 following	 the	 Christian	 teachings,	 offenders	
would	 be	 forgiven	 and	 reconciled	 to	 God	 (Romans	 5:	 9-10,	 Bible),	
enjoying	 the	 perfect	 peace	 that	 blossoms	 from	 this	 divine-vertical	
reconciliation,	in	this	life,	and	in	a	future	new	heaven	and	new	earth.	
Concluding	
Taking	 into	 account	 the	 epistemological	 turn	 developed	 at	 the	
UNESCO	Chair	of	Philosophy	for	Peace,	we	have	said	forgiveness	is	an	
imperfect	 human	 competence	 or	 ability	 for	 peace.	 That	 means,	
human	beings	 can	 forgive	each	other	horizontally	 after	 an	 immoral	
action	has	occurred	if	they	want,	having	access	to	a	sort	of	imperfect	
peace	 by	 doing	 so,	 and	 to	 an	 optional	 reconciliation	 if	 both	 parts	
want	 to	 reconcile;	 although	 reconciling	would	 not	 be	 advisable	 for	
victims	until	their	offenders	repent	of	their	wrongs.		
We	have	also	said	 that	offering	 forgiveness	would	be	adequate	
for	individual	and	collective	victims	after	harmful	actions	take	place,	
which	 could	 help	 to	 break	 the	 cycles	 of	 violence	 that	 undermine	
human	 development.	 Nevertheless,	 since	 forgiveness	 is	 a	 victims’	
prerogative	 it	 cannot	 be	 demanded	 from	 them,	 just	 suggested	 for	
prudential,	pragmatic	and	ethical	reasons.		
Furthermore,	 we	 have	 considered	 the	 theological	 Christian	
perspective,	 which	 has	 been	 taught	 during	 the	 last	 two	 thousand	
years	that	we	should	forgive	each	other	horizontally	as	human	beings	
on	a	regular	basis.	At	the	same	time,	this	perspective	states	there	is	a	
divine-vertical	 and	 perfect	 forgiveness	 available	 for	 anyone	 that	 by	
																																								 																				
15	It	is	interesting	to	notice	that	the	French	philosopher	Jacques	Derrida	(2001:	29)	wrote	that	
only	those	who	are	innocent	can	judge	others,	and	therefore	forgive	them.	
16	Former	Professor	of	Theology	and	Ethics	Lewis	B.	Smedes	said:	«God	asks	us	to	repent	not	
as	a	condition	he	needs,	but	as	a	condition	we	need	to	bring	his	forgiveness	full	circle	into	our	
own	experience»	(Bråkenhielm,	1993:	39).	
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attacking	the	dignity	of	another	person,	indirectly	would	be	attacking	
the	 God	 who	 created	 them	 too.	 That	 divine-vertical	 forgiveness	
would	be	offered	by	God	to	humankind	through	the	atoning	death	of	
Jesus,	 the	 only	 innocent	 and	 sinless	 person	 that	 ever	 lived,	 and	
therefore	the	only	one	able	to	take	upon	himself	the	immoral	actions	
of	 others.	 Those	 who	 accept	 that	 divine	 forgiveness	 through	
repentance	 could	 be	 reconciled	 to	 God,	 in	 whom	 they	 would	 find	
perfect	peace	and	rest.	
In	conclusion,	 the	pragmaticality,	prudentiality	and	ethicality	of	
human	 forgiveness	 is	 something	 worthy	 to	 explore	 deeper	 in	 the	
coming	 years,	 since	 we	 live	 in	 a	 world	 where	 violent	 conflicts	 are	
commonplace.	In	the	near	future,	learning	and	gathering	the	findings	
from	 different	 disciplines	 about	 forgiveness,	 such	 as	 Philosophy,	
Christian	theology,	Psychology	or	Politics,	among	others,	could	help	
us	 to	 develop	 a	 working	 normative	 framework	 for	 forgiveness.	
Reconstructing	 and	 promoting	 this	 imperfect	 human	 ability	 of	
forgiveness	in	post-conflict	violent	settings,	would	open	the	doors	to	
break	 the	 cycles	 of	 violence	 that	 undermine	 human	 development,	
allowing	us	to	live	in	more	peaceful	societies.	
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